Informational and/or Transactional Websites: Strategic Choices in a Distribution Channel by Karray, Salma & Sigue, Simon Pierre
Informational and/or Transactional Websites: Strategic Choices in a Distribution Channel1 
 
Salma Karray2* 
University of Ontario Institute of Technology,  
2000, Simcoe street North, Oshawa, Ontario, Canada. 
Tel.: 905-721-8668, Email: salma.karray@uoit.ca. 
Simon Pierre Sigué 
Athabasca University,  




While most businesses have faced the decision of whether to operate an informational and/or a 
transactional website, the literature on website selection in marketing channels remains very sparse. This 
paper proposes an analytical framework that compares scenarios where a manufacturer uses either an 
informational, a transactional, or both transactional and informational website in a distribution channel 
formed by one manufacturer and one retailer. We find that the selection of the optimal website depends 
on the online market base of the product, the effectiveness of the manufacturer-controlled online 
communications, and the cross-price effect between online and offline channels. For both the 
                                                            
1 © 2017. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
by-nc-nd /4.0/ 
2 Corresponding author. 
* Research funded by the National Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, Research (award # 
RGPIN-2015-03880) 
manufacturer and retailer, informational websites are preferable when the online market base is small. 
With larger online markets, the manufacturer may prefer either informational and transactional websites 
or exclusively informational websites, while the retailer is always better off with an exclusively 
informational website. Theoretical and managerial implications of these findings are discussed. 
 
Keywords: Marketing strategies, multichannel commerce, distribution channels, game theory. 
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Salma Karray and Simon 
Pierre Sigue (2017). Informational and/or Transactional Websites: Strategic Choices in 
a Distribution Channel. Journal: Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 
which has been published in final form at DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.elerap.2017. 
11.001 This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with 
Elsevier Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving. 
Informational and/or Transactional Websites: Strategic Choices in a
Distribution Channel
Abstract
While most businesses have faced the decision of whether to operate an informa-
tional and/or a transactional website, the literature on website selection in marketing
channels remains very sparse. This paper proposes an analytical framework that com-
pares scenarios where a manufacturer uses either an informational, a transactional,
or both transactional and informational website in a distribution channel formed
by one manufacturer and one retailer. We find that the selection of the optimal
website depends on the online market base of the product, the effectiveness of the
manufacturer-controlled online communications, and the cross-price effect between
online and offline channels. For both the manufacturer and retailer, informational
websites are preferable when the online market base is small. With larger online
markets, the manufacturer may prefer either informational and transactional web-
sites or exclusively informational websites, while the retailer is always better off with
an exclusively informational website. Theoretical and managerial implications of
these findings are discussed.




A crucial issue facing marketing managers when developing their digital channel
strategy is whether to develop an informational or a transactional website (Lee and
Grewal, 2004). An informational website is a support tool designed to offer infor-
mation to various stakeholders, including consumers, about products, services, and
all relevant aspects of the business; a transactional website offers the possibility for
consumers to purchase products online (Van Nierop et al., 2011). Although it is
believed that these two types of websites are developed to improve the company’s
performance, their strategic implications as well as their impacts on channel mem-
bers’ decisions and profits are different. Because transactional websites are alterna-
tive distribution channels, they change the nature of vertical interactions between
manufacturers and their traditional offline retailers. Generally, manufacturers that
sell their products to consumers online are not only partners with their offline retail-
ers, but also compete with them to a certain extent (Biyalogorsky and Naik, 2003;
Chiang et al., 2003; Neslin et al., 2006; Pu et al., 2017; Yan and Pei, 2011, 2015; Yoo
and Lee, 2011). On the other hand, informational websites contribute to expanding
consumer knowledge about the product and promotional offers with the goal of in-
creasing offline sales at the retail level, avoiding competition with traditional retailers
(Van Nierop et al., 2011).
Choosing between a transactional and informational website is an important man-
agerial issue that virtually all major companies have faced or will face. Casual obser-
vations and published works provide many interesting examples. Almost two decades
ago, Levi Strauss & Co. started a transactional website that was soon turned into
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an exclusive informational website due to conflicts with offline retailers (Chiang et
al., 2003; Yan, 2011). Today, this company operates a website that is both transac-
tional and informational. Gibson Musical Instruments (GMI) stopped online sales
operations just one month after their start to content dealers (Lee et al., 2003).
Since then, GMI has operated a state-of-the-art informational website. Zara first
operated an informational website that was later upgraded to a transactional and
informational website (Lee and Grewal, 2004; Van Nierop et al., 2011). On the other
hand, The Gap is reported to have launched, in 1996, a website that was transac-
tional and informational (Lee and Grewal, 2004). These few examples raise several
unanswered questions, including: Why do manufacturers operate a specific type of
website? Why, over time, do some manufacturers change or upgrade the type of
websites they operate? Clearly, there is a need for a comprehensive framework that
can help answer these questions and also guide the selection of the type of activities
that manufacturers can perform online.
The purpose of this paper is to analytically investigate, in a two-member channel,
the conditions under which the manufacturer should offer either an informational, a
transactional, or both an informational and transactional website. To reach this goal,
we consider a situation where the manufacturer and retailer in a bilateral monopoly
play three games: Games I, T, and TI. Game I is played when the manufacturer sup-
ports the retailer’s offline activities by providing online communications that stimu-
late offline sales. In Game T, the manufacturer develops a transactional website that
competes with the retailer’s traditional offline offering. Game TI is the combination
of the first two games, in which the manufacturer develops a transactional website
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and also offers online marketing communications to stimulate sales. In each of the
three games, the manufacturer and retailer set their pricing decisions to maximize
their own profits. We identify the conditions under which each of these three games
can be played and compare the players’ payoffs to establish their preferences. We
show that, under certain conditions, the two channel members can agree to play
either Game I or Game TI.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first analytical attempt to formally
investigate the role manufacturers’ own websites can play in their channel strategy.
The premise of our work is that the addition of either type of website influences the
performance of channel members. Operating a transactional website corresponds to
an online market expansion strategy, which allows manufacturers to reach consumers
who will not purchase otherwise, while the adoption of an informational website refers
to a penetration strategy via online communications that aims at increasing offline
sales. In particular, this paper builds on previous empirical and analytical works
which are discussed below.
Research on the use of transactional websites in marketing channels has mainly
investigated whether such sites increase overall sales or cannibalize offline sales, with
the idea that cannibalization is negative for firm performance. For instance, using the
data from Tower Records, an offline music retailer that expanded to online retailing,
Biyalogorsky and Naik (2003) find that online sales operations do not significantly
cannibalize offline sales, but contribute to building online equity that positively af-
fects future online sales. Deleersnyder et al. (2002) use data from 85 Internet channel
additions over 10 years in newspaper industries in the UK and The Netherlands and
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conclude that cannibalization of offline sales is minimal, unless online channels closely
mimic the positioning of offline channels. Geyskens et al. (2002) study the addition
of a transactional website in the newspaper sector and find both positive and nega-
tive effects on the company’s stock prices. Wolk and Skiera (2009) use survey data
from multichannel retailers and find that transactional websites fail if they are not
differentiated from offline channels, but their net effect on performance is positive,
with a stronger positive effect on strategic than on financial performances. A more
recent related study by Waterman and Ji (2012) on ten U.S. major media categories
over six decades reports that increasing revenues from Internet distribution are ex-
ceeded by declines in revenues from offline channels. This work supports the view
that not only are the total market sizes of these media declining, but cannibalization
does occur at the expense of traditional offline channels as well.
A few empirical works investigate the impact of informational websites on firm
performance. For example, Lee and Grewal (2004) study the financial market val-
uation of 106 firms over 9 years and find that markets reward firms for developing
informational websites. Pauwels et al. (2011) consider the case of a traditional offline
department store with various product categories and study the revenue implications
of the introduction of an informational website. They find, among others, that the
impact of the introduction of an informational website depends both on the prod-
uct category and on the customer segment. In particular, the revenue impact of an
informational website is higher for sensory products than for non-sensory products,
and it is also higher for consumers who live far away from the store.
On the other hand, several analytical works have studied the addition of a trans-
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actional website in the context where the manufacturer already sells the products to
offline retailers. These works are strategic in nature as they consider the interactions
between channel members and establish the conditions under which manufacturers
can operate dual channels. Channel decisions are made so as to help channel mem-
bers keep or improve their individual performance, and to avoid or lessen channel
conflicts compared to situations where manufacturers deal exclusively with offline re-
tailers (e.g., Chiang et al., 2003; Yan, 2011; Yan and Pei, 2011; Yao and Liu, 2005).
The introduction of a transactional website by a manufacturer in such a context is
known to mitigate the double marginalization effect, increase market coverage, gen-
erate price competition, and potentially lead to price discrimination to better serve
both online and offline consumers (Yoo and Lee, 2011). The effect of channel canni-
balization is believed to be minimal due to the fact that more channels serve a wider
variety of consumers.
The main innovation of this paper, compared to previous analytical works, is
the recognition of the importance of informational websites in marketing channels.
Until now, analytical works have been limited to the introduction of transactional
websites in conventional channels where manufacturers deal exclusively with retailers
without any other online presence (e.g., Cheng and Xiong, 2015; Yan, 2011; Yan
and Pei, 2011; Yoo and Lee, 2011). While situations where manufacturers do not
provide commercial information online from their own websites to stimulate sales
either online or offline do exist, they are increasingly very scarce. The real challenge
for manufacturers may not be choosing between selling or not selling online as in
the current analytical literature, but finding the right mix of commercial activities
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that can be performed online to improve channel efficiency. In any case, research on
the effects of informational websites on firm performance discussed above and on the
effects of online information on consumer behavior (e.g., Kulkarni et al., 2012; Van
Nierop et al., 2011; Ratchford et al., 2007; Viswanathan et al., 2007) indicates that
online controlled-information by manufacturers should not be ignored in strategic
interactions with retailers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the three
models. Section 3 describes the derivation of the equilibrium solutions and discusses
their feasibility conditions. Section 4 discusses the players’ preferences. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
2 Models
Consider a typical two-member channel in which a manufacturer sells a product to
a retailer, who then sells it to consumers offline or in a physical store. We assume
that there is either no external competition at the manufacturing and retail levels,
or if competition does exist, it does not change vertical interactions between the
two channel partners. The manufacturer contemplates the possibility of developing
a website that can help to increase her profits and, if possible, also enhance the
profitability of the retailer. The manufacturer has to decide whether to use the
website for informational, transactional, or for both informational and transactional
purposes. These three situations correspond to three different games as described
below.
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2.1 Game I: Informational website
In this game, the manufacturer opts for an exclusively informational website that
supports offline sales. The manufacturer sets the wholesale price, , for the product
and the level of communication effort, , to provide through the website. The retailer
sets the retail price,  , consumers pay for the product. We assume that the demand
for the product at the retailer’s store,  , linearly depends on the retail price and
the information provided online by the manufacturer. For simplicity, we adopt the
following demand function:
 = −  + 
The parameter  is positive and represents the baseline demand or total market
base of the product. The parameter  ∈ (0 1) denotes the effectiveness of online
communications undertaken by the manufacturer from her own website on retail
sales. Other forms of online communications (e.g., social media efforts) that are
either controlled or not controlled by the manufacturer are not considered in this
research. The parameter  depends on several factors that we do not control in
this research, including the type of product sold, consumer behavior, and the nature
of commercial information provided by the manufacturer. For example, for some
product categories, promotional information may be more effective in raising sales
than information that aims at increasing consumer knowledge about the product. On
the other hand, we normalize the price sensitivity to 1 to focus on other parameters,
critical to reaching the goal of this research.
As it is common in the marketing literature, production, administrative, and
operational costs, including the costs of developing and maintenaining the website,
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are set to zero. The manufacturer’s costs of delivering updated marketing commu-
nications through the website are quadratic and given by 2. Let  and  denote,
respectively, the profit functions of the manufacturer and retailer. The two channel
members set their decision variables so as to maximize their following profit func-
tions:
 = [−  + ]− 2
 = ( − )[−  + ]
2.2 Game T: Transactional website
In this game, the manufacturer opts for an exclusively transactional website. While
the product continues to be available offline through the retail store, it is also sold
online by the manufacturer. The exclusively transactional website offers nothing that
can stimulate the retailer’s offline sales. This configuration is the most studied in
the current analytical literature (e.g., Pu et al, 2017; Yan, 2011; Yoo and Lee, 2011).
In this case, in addition to setting a wholesale price as in the previous game, the
manufacturer also sets a retail price, , for her online offering. The pay-to-order
payment scheme is adopted for the manufacturer’s online operations, as the online
retail price includes delivery fees (Xu et al., 2017). The retailer also still sets a retail
price for those who want to purchase at his store. The demand functions for the
manufacturer’s online, , and retailer’s offline,  , demands are given by:
 = −  + ( − )
 = (1− )−  + ( − )
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The parameter  ∈ (0 1) denotes the proportion of the online baseline demand,
while (1− ) represents the proportion of the offline baseline demand. As in the first
model, the parameter  is still the total market base of the product, which is now
divided into two groups of consumers: those who prefer to get the product online and
those who prefer to get it offline free of charge (Yan, 2011). The new parameter  ∈
(0 1) represents the cross-price effect or the intensity of price competition between
offline and online offerings. If  = 0, there is no price competition between the
two channels and people who buy from one channel do not care about the price
offered in the other channel. If  = 1, any difference between offline and online prices
will heavily impact the demands of the two channels. Many factors may affect this
parameter, including the differentiation of offline and online offerings, and consumer
attachment to channels. For parsimony, we assume a symmetric cross-price effect
between online and offline channels in this case.
In addition, we assume that the manufacturer’s online retail price is higher than
her wholesale price to the offline retailer (i.e.,   ). This is a practical assump-
tion that ensures the retailer does not have an incentive to buy online for offline
reselling.
As in the previous model, production, administrative, and operational costs, in-
cluding the costs of developing and maintenaining the website, are set to zero. The
profit functions of the two channel members are:
 =  + 
 = ( − ) 
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Compared to Game I, the manufacturer now generates revenues from both online
and offline channels, while the retailer’s only revenues come from the offline channel.
2.3 Game TI: Transactional and informational website
We now consider the scenario where the manufacturer develops a website for both
transactional and informational purposes in a more integrated approach. The goal
is to take advantage of the full potential of one’s own website as a communication
tool and as a distribution channel. As a communication tool, the manufacturer uses
the website to perform activities that support and stimulate both online and offline
sales. The retailer still determines a retail price, while the manufacturer now sets a
retail price for the online offering, a wholesale price for the offline offering, and the
online communication effort to consumers. The online and offline demand functions
depend on the retail prices and the manufacturer’s online communication effort as
follows:
 = −  + ( − ) + 
 = (1− )−  + ( − ) + 
Most of the assumptions are identical to those previously discussed. An additional
assumption here is that the information provided on the website is equally effective
() on the online and offline demands. This is obviously a simplification given that
online and offline buyers may not react identically to online communication activities.
In any case, the manufacturer adopts an integrated communication approach that
reaches both online and offline buyers with the same message. For example, when
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online promotional activities are undertaken, they are accessible to both online and
offline buyers. Consumers are given the choice to use their preferred channel, but
there is no communication effort from the manufacturer to change their preference
from one channel to another.
The profit functions of the two channel members in this game are as follows:
 =  +  − 2
 = ( − ) 
Table 1 summarizes our specifications for the three models.
Insert Table 1 about here
3 Equilibrium solutions and feasibility conditions
The manufacturer and retailer play a Stackelberg game in the indirect channel in
each of the three games. The manufacturer is assigned the leadership role and the
retailer is the follower in the indirect channel. The sequence of moves for the two
players in each game is as follows. When applicable, the manufacturer first announces
her wholesale price and the level of communication effort and the retailer and the
manufacturer (Models T and TI) simultaneously set their retail prices.
Optimal solutions are derived backwards. This means that the retailer in Model
I and the retailer and manufacturer in Models T and TI first obtain their optimal
retail prices. The manufacturer’s optimal wholesale prices and online communica-
tion efforts are derived after the introduction of the optimal retail prices into the
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manufacturer’s profit functions. The derivation and the equilibrium solutions for
the three games are detailed in the Appendix. As well, in the Appendix, we further
set the market base () to 1 without loss of generality. All concavity conditions for
the manufacturer’s and retailer’s problems in each game are verified. We obtain a
unique equilibrium solution for each of the three games. These optimal solutions all
depend on the model parameters. We therefore investigate whether some conditions
need to be imposed on the parameters to obtain non-negative profits, positive pricing
decisions and margins, and positive online investments.
Game I is always feasible regardless of the values of the parameter  in the range
of (0 1). To identify the conditions under which Games T and TI are feasible, we
conduct numerical simulations for different values of the parameters. Our findings
are summarized in Figure 1 below.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Figure 1.1 displays the feasible conditions of Game T in the space of the two
relevant parameters in this case:  and  UF denotes the area in the parameter
space in which the equilibrium solution is unfeasible. This game is always feasible
when the online market base is at least identical to the market base at the retailer’s
store. If the online market base is relatively smaller than the offline market base
(04    05), the intensity of price competition between the two channels does
matter. Game T is more likely to be feasible in this range if the intensity of price
competition between the two channels is very high.
For Game TI, there are three relevant parameters: , , and . We find that,
regardless of the values of the other model parameters, the equilibrium solution of
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this game is always unfeasible (feasible) when   04 (  05). On the other hand,
when, 04    05, the equilibrium solution of this game can be feasible depending
on the values of the two other model parameters,  and . Figure 1.2 provides an
illustration. In particular, Game TI is more likely to be feasible in this area when
higher values of the effectiveness of the manufacturer’s online communications are
combined with higher levels of price competition between channels.
4 Choosing a website strategy
In this section, we compare the equilibrium strategies and profits of the three games
taking into account the feasibility conditions previously discussed. In some cases,
we are able to obtain analytical results. In others, we resort to numerical analyses
to obtain meaningful insights. In particular, we vary the parameters values in the
following ranges:    ∈ (0 1) by a step size of 002, in the feasible domain where
the three games can be effectively played. All results are summarized in Table 2.
The columns  − ,  −  , and  −  represent the findings of the comparisons
between the two specified games. The sign "+" ("−") indicates that we are able
to prove that the outcome of the first game is superior (inferior) to the outcome
of the second game. The sign "±" indicates that we are able to find values of the
parameters for which any of the two games can have an inferior or superior outcome
depending on the values of the parameters. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Insert Table 2 about here
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4.1 Informational website
The proposition below indicates when the manufacturer should automatically opt
for an exclusively informational website.
Proposition 1 When the online market base is not very large (  04), the man-
ufacturer should have an exclusively informational website to support offline sales.
This finding is derived directly from the analysis of the feasibility conditions of
the three games. Games T and TI are not feasible when   04, while Game I
is always feasible. Consequently, opening a transactional website when the online
market base is not large enough is not conductive to sustainable business practices
between the manufacturer and retailer. In particular, because the online market base
is relatively small, the manufacturer should set a relatively small online price that
contributes to the cannibalization of the offline sales. This situation is known to
create channel conflicts between manufacturers and retailers as it directly damages
the profitability of retailers’ offline stores. As a matter of fact, it is reported that
Levi Strauss & Co. originally terminated its online sales operations due to such
conflicts. After this decision, this company did, however, maintain for many years
an informational website that provided useful information to various stakeholders,
including customers. A company such as Zara had an informational website for some
time before upgrading to an informational and transactional website.
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4.2 Different preferences
Considering the feasibility conditions of the three games, results derived from the
comparisons of the manufacturer’s profits are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 When the three games are simultaneously feasible, the manufacturer:
(1) prefers a website used for both informational and transactional purposes to an
exclusively transactional website, (2) may prefer either an exclusively transactional
website or an exclusively informational website depending on the parameters, and
(3) may prefer either a transactional and informational website or an exclusively
informational website depending on the parameters.
Given that the manufacturer always prefers an informational and transactional
website to an exclusively transactional website in Proposition 2, the real decision
for the manufacturer is therefore whether to develop an exclusively informational
website or a website that combines both transactional and informational features.
We illustrate in Figure 2 below how the manufacturer’s profits compare in these two
situations.
Insert Figure 2 about here
The findings in Figure 2 support the view that pursuing a strategy that com-
bines market expansion and market penetration is more rewarding for the manufac-
turer than further penetrating the offline market when the online market becomes
very large, given the other model parameters. This is because an informational
and transactional website allows the manufacturer to also serve new customers that
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the retailer’s store cannot reach even with the support of an informational web-
site. The manufacturer’s maximum sales are then achieved by using the Internet
to further penetrate the offline market and to expand sales online. This finding is
consistent with previous works that support the view that serving a broader base
of consumers benefits the manufacturer (e.g., Yoo and Lee, 2011). However, when
the manufacturer’s online communication is not very effective, pursuing an offline
market penetration strategy alone with online communications can still be the best
strategic choice for relatively large online markets. This ensures that all consumers
who look for information online and can buy offline are well served before going after
those who exclusively purchase online.
Proposition 3 When the three games are simultaneously feasible, the retailer prefers:
(1) an exclusively informational website to an exclusively transactional website, (2)
an exclusively informational website to an informational and transactional website,
and (3) an informational and transactional website to an exclusively transactional
website.
As expected, the manufacturer’s exclusive offline penetration strategy that con-
sists of stimulating only offline sales through online communications better serves
the interests of the retailer than any other of the two strategies where the manu-
facturer also starts selling directly online. As we can see in Table 2, this finding is
explained by the fact that the manufacturer’s online expansion introduces competi-
tion in the market. As a consequence, the retailer reduces her offline retail price to
stay competitive and also loses some of her customers to the manufacturer’s online
channel due to the well-known cannibalization effect (Biyalogorsky and Naik, 2003;
17
Geyskens et al., 2002). Even if the manufacturer’s wholesale price goes down when
a transactional component is added to the website, such a change does not generally
aim at increasing the retailer’s profitability (Yoo and Lee, 2011). The manufacturer
is more concerned with maximizing her two revenue streams in Games T and TI
than helping the retailer to reach the maximum sales possible as in Game I.
The comparison of the retailer’s profits in Games TI and T shows that the re-
tailer is always better off in Game TI. This is essentially due to the fact that the
manufacturer commits more resources to providing online information that benefits
her through both the online and offline channels. As a consequence, sales via the two
channels increase, allowing all channel members to charge higher prices and obtain
better returns.
5 Conclusion
This paper analytically examines the type of website a manufacturer should develop
to improve channel performance when dealing with an offline retailer in the context
of a bilateral monopoly. The following three types of websites are considered: An
informational website that supports offline sales with online communications, a trans-
actional website that allows the purchase of the product online, and an integrated
website that performs both of the functions of the first two websites. The optimal
equilibrium strategies and profits are obtained for these three games. Conditions
under which these equilibrium solutions are feasible are identified. The comparisons
of the players’ profits across these games reveal their preferences with respect to the
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different websites. The theoretical and managerial implications of our findings are
discussed below.
First, we find that when the offline (online) market base is relatively large (small),
the manufacturer should exclusively operate an informational website to further pen-
etrate the offline market. The two other website alternatives should only be consid-
ered when the online market base is significant enough to allow sustainable business
between channel members. Otherwise, further penetration of the offline market with
the exclusive use of online marketing communications is desirable. Therefore, factors
that affect the size of the online market should drive any online expansion decision.
Examples of such factors include product compatibility with online sales, customer
dispersion, and customer aversion to or preference for online shopping. The exis-
tence of a relatively large online market may not, however, be enough to support the
development of a transactional website. In some cases, the manufacturer should also
consider the effectiveness of her online communications directed to offline consumers
and the cross-price effect between online and offline channels. As a result, even if
having a transactional website is conducive to a sustainable business for all chan-
nel members, a manufacturer can still adopt an informational website as the best
profit-maximizing alternative.
Second, the manufacturer and retailer earn more profits when the manufacturer
operates both an informational and transactional website than an exclusively trans-
actional website. To understand the importance of this finding, one has to remember
that the two channel members’ preferences may differ when exclusively informational
and transactional websites are considered. This means that not only is the manu-
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facturer financially better off, but she also avoids potential channel conflict with
the retailer by adopting a transactional and informational website instead of an ex-
clusively transactional one. Therefore, from a retailer’s perspective, the common
argument that manufacturers use transactional websites to target consumers who do
not normally purchase offline is more convincing if these websites are developed to
support both online and offline sales with online integrated marketing communica-
tions programs. An online market expansion strategy should not be undertaken at
the expense of a penetration strategy that appeals to people who look for information
online and make their purchases offline.
Third, while the manufacturer may be better off with an informational and trans-
actional website, it does not serve the best interest of the retailer compared to an
exclusively informational website. In this case, the manufacturer’s preference de-
pends on the offline market base, the effectiveness of her online communications, and
the price competition between online and offline channels. This finding suggests that
manufacturers who first start informational websites may face opposition to their
online expansion ambitions from retailers if market conditions change to allow them
to add a transactional component to their websites. Sales cannibalization, unfair
price competition, and lack of effective online communications that support offline
sales may all be used by retailers to advocate for the status quo, which is maintaining
the use of an exclusively informational website. In such a context, the onus is on the
manufacturer to demonstrate that her online expansion overcomes these legitimate
concerns.
Summarizing, the theory developed in this paper supports the view that manu-
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facturers’ observed website practices can be explained by the combination of three
factors: the online (offline) market base, the effectiveness of manufacturer-controlled
online communications, and the intensity of price competition between online and of-
fline channels. For example, the reported increase of online shopping trends changes
the online market base for several products. Everything else being equal, this might
explain why in the 90s, Levi Strauss & Co. could not convince its dealers to accept its
online sales operations, and other less adventurous companies opted to start with in-
formational websites. Given the nature of its products, Gibson Musical Instruments
has not yet reached the online market base threshold necessary to start successful
online sales operations that will not jeopardize offline operations. One may imagine
that once this threshold is reached, expanding online could even become beneficial to
dealers. As a matter of fact, Geyskens et al. (2002) reported that Barnes and Noble
saw a record sales increase in offline stores upon launching online sales operations.
Future research can extend this work in many ways. We have kept our model
simple to derive meaningful analytical insights. Future studies can explore more
complex set-ups such as ones where competition from other manufacturers and online
retailers is considered. Other extensions can also be explored such as the operational
costs of managing the website, especially for transactional purposes, and the retailer’s




Biyalogorsky, E., Naik, P., 2003. Clicks andmortar: The effect of on-line activities
on off-line sales. Marketing Letters 14(1), 21-32.
Cheng, Y., Xiong, Z., 2015. Strategic conditions for opening an Internet store
and pricing policies in a retailer-dominant supply chain. Mathematical Problems in
Engineering. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/640719.
Chiang, W.K., Chhajed, D., Hess, J.D., 2003. Direct marketing, indirect profits:
a strategic analysis of dual-channel supply-chain design. Management Science 49,
1-20.
Deleersnyder, B., Geyskens, I., Gielens, K., Dekimpe, M.G., 2002. How cannibal-
istic is the Internet channel? A study of the newspaper industry in the United King-
dom and the Netherlands. International Journal of Research in Marketing 19(4),
337-348.
Geyskens, I., Gielens, K., Dekimpe, M.G., 2002. The market valuation of Internet
channel additions. Journal of Marketing 66, 102-119.
Huang, W., Swaminathan, J.M., 2009. Introduction of a second channel: Im-
plications for pricing and profits. European Journal of Operational Research 194,
258-279.
Kulkarni, G., Ratchford, B.T., Kannan, P.K., 2012. The impact of online and
offline information sources on automobile choice behavior. Journal of Interactive
Marketing 26, 167-175.
Lee, R.P., Grewal, R., 2004. Strategic responses to new technologies and their
impact on firm performance. Journal of Marketing 68, 157-171.
22
Lee, Y., Lee, Z., Larsen, K.R.T., 2003. Coping with Internet channel conflict.
Communications of the ACM 46(7), 137-142.
Neslin, S.A., Grewal, D., Leghorn, R., Shankar, V., Teerling, M.L., Thomas,
J.S., Verhoef, P.C., 2006. Challenges and opportunities in multichannel customer
management. Journal of Service Research 9(2), 95-112.
Pauwels, K., Leeflang, P.S.H., Teerling, M.L., Huizingh, K.R.E., 2011. Does
online information drive offline revenues? Only for specific products and consumer
segments! Journal of Retailing 87(1), 1-17.
Pu, X., Gong, L., Han, X., 2017. Consumer free riding: Coordinating sales effort
in a dual-channel. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications 22, 1-12.
Ratchford, B.T., Talukdar, D., Lee, M., 2007. The impact of the Internet on
consumers’ use of information sources for automobiles: A re-inquiry. Journal of
Consumer Research 34, 111-119.
Van Nierop, J.E.M, Leeflang, P.S.H, Teerling, M.L., Huizingh, K.R.E., 2011. The
impact of the introduction and use of an informational website on offline customer
buying behavior. International Journal of Research in Marketing 28, 155-165.
Viswanathan, S., Kuruzovich, J., Gosain, S., Agarwal, R. 2007. Online info-
mediaries and price discrimination: Evidence from the automobile retailing sector.
Journal of Marketing 71, 89-107.
Waterman, D., Ji, S.W., 2012. Online versus offline in the United States: Are
the media shrinking? The Information Society 28, 285-303.
Wolk, A., Skiera, B., (2009). Antecedents and consequences of Internet channel
performance. Journal of Consumer Services, 16, 163-173.
23
Xu, N., Bai, S.-Z., Wan, X., 2017. Adding pay-on-delivery to pay-to-order: The
value of two payment schemes to online sellers. Electronic Commerce Research and
Applications 21, 27-37.
Yan, R., 2011. Managing channel coordination in a multi-channel manufacturer-
retailer supply chain. Industrial Marketing Management 40, 636-642.
Yan, R., Pei, Z., 2011. Information asymmetry, pricing strategy and firm’s perfor-
mance in the retailer-multi-channel manufacturer supply chain. Journal of Business
Research 64(4), 377-384.
Yan, R., Pei, Z., 2015. The strategic value of cooperative advertising in the dual-
channel competition. International Journal of Electronic Commerce 19(3), 118-143.
Yao, D., Liu, J., 2005. Competitive pricing of mixed retail and detail distribution
channels. Omega 33, 235—47.
Yoo, W.S., Lee, E., 2011. Internet channel entry: A strategic analysis of mixed
channel structures. Marketing Science 30(1), 29-41.
6 Appendix
6.1 Equilibrium solutions and feasibility conditions
We solve each game by backward induction to get the equilibrium solution for each
game. We get the following results.
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6.1.1 Game I
Proposition 4 In Game I, the equilibrium strategies and profits are as follows
 =
4
8− 2  
 =












Proof: We solve Game I by backward induction. We start by solving the retailer’s
and the manufacturer’s problems simultaneously given by
max

 = ( − ) [−  + ] 
max

 =  [−  + ]− 2





= 0). The concavity conditions are verified for any  ∈ (0 1)  The




 =  [−  + ]− 2
We get the equilibrium manufacturer’s online and wholesale prices by solving




= 0). The manufacturer’s concavity
conditions are verified for any  ∈ (0 1)  The obtained expressions are then inserted
into the reaction functions to get the equilibrium solution as a function of the model
parameters given in proposition 4.
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Note that the equilibrium solution satisfies the conditions that all equilibrium
strategies, as well as the retailer’s margin, demand and profits are positive for any
 ∈ (0 1) 
6.1.2 Game T
Proposition 5 In Game T, the equilibrium strategies and profits are as follows
 =
94 + (32− 7)3 + 24(2− )2 + 8(4− 3)− 8 (− 1)




(1086 + 6425 + 15264 + 18803 + 12722 + 448+ 64)
 (2)
 =
(+ 2)(93 + 52+ 202 + 14+ 10+ 8)(3+ 2)(1 + )
(1086 + 6425 + 15264 + 18803 + 12722 + 448+ 64)
 (3)
 =
(1− )(32 + 4+ 2)(+ 2)(1 + 2)(3+ 2)(1 + )
(546 + 3215 + 7634 + 9403 + 6362 + 224+ 32)
 (4)
 =
(+ 2)(63+ 33 + 212+ 42 + 22+ 2+ 8)(1 + 2)(3+ 2)
(1086 + 6425 + 15264 + 18803 + 12722 + 448+ 64)
 (5)
 =
(− 1)2(32 + 4+ 2)2








4 − 193+ 443 − 462+
702 − 40+ 48− 12+ 12
2 = 9
4 + 2(42 + + 12)3 + (292 + 28− 8)2
+16(22 + 1− )+ 4 (1− )2 + 42
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Proof: We solve Game T by backward induction. We start in stage 2 by solving
the retailer’s and the manufacturer’s problems simultaneously given by
max

 = ( − ) [(1− )−  +  ( − )] 
max

 =  [(1− )−  + ] +  [(−  +  ( − )] 




 by solving the system of first-




= 0). The retailer’s and manufacturer’s
concavity conditions are negative and given by (−2− 2), and are therefore verified




(32 + 4+ 2) + 2 (1− ) + (2− )
(+ 2) (3+ 2)

 ( ) =
3 (+ 1) + + + 2
(+ 2) (3+ 2)















−  ( ) + ( ( ) −  ( ) )
i

We get the manufacturer’s equilibrium wholesale price by solving her first-order
optimality condition (

= 0). The manufacturer’s concavity condition is negative
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and given by
−2(1 + 2) (+ 1) (9






Therefore, the manufacturer’s concavity condition is verified for all parameters
  ∈ (0 1)  The obtained expressions are then inserted into the reaction functions to
get the equilibrium solution as function of the model parameters given in proposition
5.
Note that, for any   ∈ (0 1)  it is easy to see from the expressions in (1)-(7),
that the equilibrium decisions and output are always positive. Additionally, we verify
that the retailer’s margin given by
( −  ) =
(1− ) (4+ 32 + 2)
(+ 1) (16+ 92 + 8)
is also positive for any   ∈ (0 1). Finally,
( −  ) =
(+ 2) (19+ 122 + 8) − (33 + 182 + 22+ 8)
2 (2+ 1) (+ 1) (16+ 92 + 8) 

Hence, the condition that guarantees a manufacturer’s online price that is higher
than its wholesale price is as follows:
 
33 + 182 + 22+ 8
(+ 2) (19+ 122 + 8)
 (8)
Therefore, the above condition defines the feasibility domain for Game T (repre-
sented in Figure 1.1). Since the right-hand expression in (8) is strictly increasing in
, in all the feasible domain of Game T, the parameter  will exceed the maximum
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value of this expression, which is realized for  = 1 and is given by 04359
6.1.3 Game TI
Proposition 6 In Game TI, the equilibrium strategies are denoted by the superscript
() and are as follows
 =
21
(1 + 2)(1832 + 4522 − 363 + 402 − 1002 + 122 − 96− 32)  (9)
 =
−(93 + 52+ 202 + 8+ 16+ 4+ 4)
(1832 + 4522 − 363 + 402 − 1002 + 122 − 96− 32)  (10)
 =
2
(1 + 2)(1832 + 4522 − 363 + 402 − 1002 + 122 − 96− 32) (11)
 =
4(1 + )
(1 + 2)(1832 + 4522 − 363 + 402 − 1002 + 122 − 96− 32) (12)
 =
(22− 2 − 4+ 4)2(32 + 4+ 2)2(1 + )
(1832 + 4522 − 363 + 402 − 1002 + 122 − 96− 32)2  (13)
 =
3
(1 + 2)(1832 + 4522 − 363 + 402 − 1002 + 122 − 96− 32) (14)
where
1 = 8(− 1) + 
¡−48+ 24+ 72+ 24− 322 − 32− 93¢
+(3+ 2) (1− 2)((+ 1) )2
2 = 24(− 1)− 184 + (38− 88) 3 + (92− 140) 2 + (80− 96) 
+2
¡
22+ 272 + 123 + 6
¢
(1− 2) 
3 = 8− 122 − 4− 94 − 2
¡
+ 42 + 12
¢
3 + (8− 292 − 28)2
−16 ¡1− + 22¢ + 2 (+ 1)3 (2− 1)2 
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4 = 6
2− 183 − 102− 32 + 42− 402 − 28− 22 − 20− 16
Proof: We solve Game TI by backward induction. We start in stage 2 by solving
the retailer’s and the manufacturer’s problems simultaneously given by
max

 = ( − ) [(1− )−  +  ( − ) + ] 
max

 =  [(1− )−  + ] +  [(−  +  ( − ) + ]− 2




 by solving the system of




= 0). The retailer’s and manufacturer’s
concavity conditions are negative and given by (−2− 2), and are therefore verified




(32 + 4+ 2) + 2 (1− ) + (2− ) + (3+ 2) 
(+ 2) (3+ 2)

 () =
3 (+ 1) + + + 2+ (3+ 2) 
(+ 2) (3+ 2)






























= 0). The manufacturer’s second order conditions
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are given by









with  = − (2+ 1) (−96+ 402 + 4522 + 1832 − 1002 − 363 + 122 − 32
Note that for any    ∈ (0 1), both conditions in (15) and (16) are always
satisfied. Therefore, the concavity conditions for the manufacturer’s problem in
Game T are verified for all parameters    ∈ (0 1)  The obtained solutions in (9)




 to get the
equilibrium prices as function of the model parameters.
Note that the equilibrium solution satisfies the conditions that   ( − )
 and 
 are always positive for any    ∈ (0 1)  Further, the denominator
of  is always negative, and, from the reaction functions, for any   0,  is
always positive.
Lastly, the condition that guarantees positive wholesale price (), offline de-
mand ( ), online demand (

), manufacturer’s profit (
), and a manufacturer’s
online price that is higher than its wholesale price is as follows:
  max (1 3) 





− ((6− 62) 3 + (36− 192) 2 + (44− 192) + (16− 62))





(4+ 72 + 822 + 332 + 82 + 63 + 22)
((32 − 6) 3 + (82 − 21) 2 + (72 − 22) + (22 − 8)) 
4 =
¡
4 32 + 1222 + 12 2 + 42 − 32− 12− 29 2 − 83¢ 2
−2 ¡−8+ 62 + 622 + 232 − 42 + 3 + 22 − 4¢ 
+
¡¡
2 − 24¢ 3 − 94 + ¡32 − 28¢ 2 + ¡32 − 16¢ + ¡2 − 4¢¢ 
5 =
− (632 − 184 + 1622 − 64 3 + 14 2 − 96 2 + 42 − 64− 16)
(−1232 + 143 − 3222 + 482 − 282 − 82 + 48+ 16) 
The expression 1 is strictly decreasing in both  (
1

 0) and  (1

 0).
Therefore, min(1 ( )) = 1 (0 0) = 0388 and max(1 ( )) = 1 (1 1) = 05
Hence,   1 is a valid condition for this game. Similarly,
2

 0 for any  ∈ (0 1).
Therefore, the min(2 ()) = 2 (0) = 15. Hence, the condition   2 is always
verified for any  ∈ (0 1). Further, for    ∈ (0 1)  3  0 therefore the condition
  3 is always verified.
4 is a second degree polynomial in  The discriminant of this polynomial is
given by ∆ such as:




182 − 36¢ 3 + ¡452 − 100¢ 2
+
¡
402 − 96¢ + ¡122 − 32¢]
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For any given    ∈ (0 1)  ∆  0 Therefore, there are no real roots to 4 in 
and 4 has the same sign for any ∈ (0 1)  We can then determine the sign of 4
by setting  = 0 and computing 4 value, which is then given by:
¡
2 − 24¢ 3 − 94 + ¡32 − 28¢ 2 + ¡32 − 16¢ + ¡2 − 4¢ 
Since this expression is negative for any   ∈ (0 1)  then 4  0 for any given
   ∈ (0 1)  Hence, the condition   4 is always verified. Finally, the expression
5 is strictly increasing in both  (
5

 0) and  (5

 0). Therefore,min(5 ( )) =
5 (0 0) = 1 Since   1 bymodel set-up, then the condition   5 is always verified.
Therefore, the necessary and sufficient condition for an interior equilibrium solu-
tion in Game TI is
  1 (17)
This condition defines the feasibility condition for Game TI. It is represented in
Figure 1.2.
6.2 Comparisons between games
To compare the equilibrium solutions and outputs between games, we write the
analytical expressions of each comparison and seek the sign of each expression ana-
lytically, considering the feasible domain for each Game. When we cannot determine
these signs analytically, we plot these expressions as implicit plots for  ∈ (0 1) and
for acceptable values of  considering the feasibility condition for the games being
compared. These plots are obtained for  ∈ (0 1) at an increment of 004
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6.2.1 Comparisons of Games T and I
Comparisons of profits Comparisons of equilibrium profits obtained in Games
TI and I are reported in the second column of Table 2 ( − ). The analytical
expressions of these comparisons are as follows:
 −  = − 5
4 (2+ 1) (+ 1) (16+ 92 + 8) (2 − 8) 
 − = 6




8− 2¢ [94 + 2(42 + + 12)3 + (292 − 8+ 28)2 + 16(22 − + 1)
+4
¡















2 − 8¢2 (− 1)2 − 256´ 
It’s easy to see that 6 is always negative for any    ∈ (0 1)  Therefore,  
 We cannot determine the sign of5 and of the total profit comparisons expression
analytically, so we plot these expressions considering the feasibility condition for
Game T in (8), since the Game I equilibrium solution is feasible for all  ∈ (0 1), in
order to find the results reported in Table 2.
Insert Figures A.1 and A.2
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Comparisons of prices and demands
 −  = 12 1
(2 − 8) (1 + 2 ) (1 + ) (9 2 + 16 + 8) 
 −  = 12
2
(2 − 8) (1 + 2 ) (1 + ) (92 + 16 + 8) 
 −  =
3




9 2 + 72
¢
4 + 8 (1− ) 2 + 64 + ¡(−7 + 32) 2 + 56 + 216¢ 3
+
¡
(−24 + 48) 2 + 192 + 200¢ 2 + ¡(−24 + 32) 2 + 192 + 64¢ 
2 =
¡
9 2 + 144
¢
4 + 12 (1− ) 2 + 96 + [(−19 + 44) 2 + 152 + 356]3
+
¡
(−46 + 70) 2 + 368 + 316¢ 2 + ¡(−40 + 48) 2 + 320 + 96¢ 
3 =
¡
16− 2 ¡32 − 24¢− 22 −  ¡42 − 42¢¢ + ¡42 + 2 ¡32 − 6¢+ 22¢ 
It is easy to see that the expressions (−) and ¡ − ¢ are negative for any
values of    ∈ (0 1)  Finally,¡ − ¢ is positive iff 3  0 which is equivalent
to   4 ( )  such that 4 ( ) =
−(42+2(32−6)+22)
16−2(32−24)−22−(42−42)  The expression 4
is strictly increasing in  (4

 0) and decreasing in  (4

 0). Therefore,
max(4) = 4 (1 0) = 0073 Given that   043 in all feasible domains of Game T,






6.2.2 Comparisons between Games TI and T
Comparisons of profits Comparisons of equilibrium profits obtained in Games
TI and I are reported in the third column of Table 5 ( −  ). The analytical
expressions of these comparisons are as follows.
M-M=
−2 (93 + 52+ 202 + 8+ 16+ 4+ 4)2
4 (1 + ) (92 + 16+ 8) (1832 + 4522 − 363 + 402 − 1002 + 122 − 96− 32)>0.
Therefore  −  0 for any   and  given the feasibility condition for
Game T in (8) and for Game TI in (17).
− = (3 
2 + 4 + 2)
2
2 (9 3 + 5 2+ 20 2 + 8 + 16 + 4 + 4)Ω






882 − 192¢+ 3 ¡362 − 72¢+ 2 ¡952 − 200¢+ 282 − 64¢ 
+
¡
64− 3 ¡272 − 72¢− 2 ¡702 − 200¢− 202 −  ¡642 − 192¢¢ 
Since the denominator of
¡
 −¢ is always positive, we focus on the study
of the numerator. The latter is positive if and only if Ω  0, which is equivalent
to   5 ( )  such that 5 ( ) =
−192+642+7022+2732−2002−723+202−64
−192+882+9522+3632−2002−723+282−64  The
expression 5 is strictly increasing in both  (
5

 0) and  (5

 0). Therefore,
min(5) = 4 (0 0) = 1 Given that   1 , then   5 in all feasible domains, which
means that Ω  0 and    in all feasible domains.
Since  −  0 and  −   0 then the sum of these expressions is
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also positive, which means that the total channel profit is higher in Game TI than
in Game T.
Comparisons of prices and demands Comparisons of equilibrium prices and
demands obtained in Games TI and I are reported in the third column of Table 2
( −  ). The analytical expressions of these comparisons are as follows.
 −  = −
2(3+2)(32+6+4)(93+52+202+8+16+4+4)
2(1+)(92+16+8)(1832+4522−363+402−1002+122−96−32) 
 −  =
−2(93+302+32+12)(93+52+202+8+16+4+4)
2(1+)(92+16+8)(1832+4522−363+402−1002+122−96−32) 
 −  =
−2(3+4)(3+2)(93+52+202+8+16+4+4)
2(92+16+8)(1832+4522−363+402−1002+122−96−32) 
 −  =
−(93+52+202+8+16+4+4)2(32+4+2)
(92+16+8)(1832+4522−363+402−1002+122−96−32) 
 −  =
−(3+2)(42+7+4)(93+52+202+8+16+4+4)2
2(1+)(92+16+8)(1832+4522−363+402−1002+122−96−32) 
It is easy to see that all these expressions are positive for any    ∈ (0 1) 
6.2.3 Comparisons between Games TI and I
Comparisons of profits Comparisons of equilibrium profits obtained in Games
TI and I are reported in the fourth column of Table 2 ( − ). The analytical
expressions of these comparisons are as follows:






We cannot determine the signs of these expressions and of the total profit com-
parisons analytically, so we plot these expressions for  ∈ (0 1) and for acceptable
values of  considering the feasibility condition for Game TI in (17). These plots
are obtained for  ∈ (0 1)  at an increment of 004, since the Game I equilibrium
solution is feasible for all  ∈ (0 1). We find the results reported in Table 2.
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Insert Figure A.3
Comparisons of prices and demands Comparison of equilibrium prices and
demand in games TI and I gives the following results:
 −  = 1
(1+2)(1832+4522−363+402−1002+122−96−32)(2−8) 
 −  = 2(1+2)(1832+4522−363+402−1002+122−96−32)(2−8) 
 −  = 3(1832+4522−363+402−1002+122−96−32)(2−8)
where
1 = −2 (2 − 8) (−24+ 142 + 1622 + 632 − 242 − 73 + 42 − 8) +2(−64+
402+74+13822+16032+824+6342+334−2002−2163−724+24)
2 = −2 (2 − 8) (−40+ 222 + 2722 + 1232 − 462 − 193 + 62 − 12)  +
 (224 + 1122 − 192)+2 (274 + 3942 − 632)+3 (124 + 4642 − 712)+4 (1982 − 288)+
64
3 = −2 (2 − 2) (2 − 8) (+ 1) (4+ 32 + 2) + (64 + 82)+2 (74 + 62 + 24)+
3 (34 + 24) + 24
Since the denominators of all these expressions are always positive, we focus on
studying the numerators.
1  0⇔   6 = (63
2−72)4+(34+1602−216)3+(84+1382−200)2+(74+402−64)+24
(2−8)(−24+142+1622+632−242−73+42−8) 
2  0⇔   7 = (22
4+1122−192)+2(274+3942−632)+3(124+4642−712)+4(1982−288)+64
2(2−8)(−40+222+2722+1232−462−193+62−12) 
3  0⇔   8 = (6
4+82)+2(74+62+24)+3(34+24)+24
2(2−2)(2−8)(+1)(4+32+2) 
The expression 6 is strictly increasing in both  (
8

 0) and  (8

 0).
Therefore, min(8) = 8 (0 0) = 0 and max(8) = 8(1 1) = 0317 Given the
feasibility condition for Game TI in (17),   8 in all feasible domains, which




 in all feasible domains.
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We cannot determine the signs of the expressions 6 and 7 and of their derivatives
with respect to  and  analytically. Therefore, we plot 6 and 7 considering the
feasibility condition for Game TI in (17). The Game I equilibrium solution is feasible
for all  ∈ (0 1), in order to find the results reported in Table 2.
Table 1: Models
     
Demand functions
Online demand () −  0 −  + 
+( − ) +( − )
Offline demand () (1− )−  −  +  (1− )−  + 
+( − ) +( − )
Profit functions
Manufacturer ()  +   − 2  +  − 2
Retailer () ( − ) ( − ) ( − )
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Table 2: Summary of comparisons across games
( − ) ( −  ) ( − )
Effects on profits
Retailer profit − + −
Manufacturer profit ± + ±
Total channel profit ± + ±
Effects on prices
Retail price offline − + −
Manufacturer price online +
Wholesale price − + −
Effects on demand
Retailer demand offline − + −
Manufacturer demand online +
40
